On June 29, 2023, both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac announced enhancements to their MBS disclosures starting with the September monthly release[1]. The data covers active pools issued back to January 2022. As rates were quite low prior to this time, these disclosures cover the relevant period of high demand for buydowns:
We’ve written many, many times about the inexorable rise in the role of nonbanks in the mortgage market[1]. A variety of factors have contributed to these gains, including superior technology, a relatively less oppressive regulatory environment, and Covid-19 chasing people out of bank branches online.
This picture can be a little blurry, however, depending on the way you look at the market. There is, for example, the distinction between servicing book shares and origination shares. Our agency disclosure data doesn’t provide information on originators, but we can use “seller” as a proxy. The table below looks at the trends in outstanding portfolio and issuance for the conforming and Government markets over the period January 2022 – July 2023: Overview
The release of the Financial Accounts of the United States (also known as the Z.1[1]) is always an opportunity to learn about important structural changes in the mortgage market. This is particularly the case in our current environment of high home prices and borrowing costs which we call “mortgage winter”. In this note, we focus on the breakdown on the ownership of risk for single family mortgages. This is not the share of ownership of MBS; it is who bears the credit risk for the loans. Unsurprisingly, the growth in single-family mortgage credit outstanding in Q1 grew by the smallest amount in almost 7 years in the first quarter of 2023: The release of the Agency performance data in early May provided confirmation that the dip in Early Payment Defaults[1] we have witnessed over the last three months ended a 16-month long uptrend in this statistic for FHA loans. A similar but far more muted pattern can be seen for VA and conventional mortgages. In a previous post, we speculated that the uptrend was correlated with the higher inflationary trend observed since early 2021[2]. Below please find an update of the chart:
Introducing the Recursion Agency Multifamily Dataset Part 2: Outstanding Balance Benchmarking3/20/2023
In a recent post, we introduced the Recursion Agency Multifamily Dataset, a complete accounting of multifamily loans securitized in Agency pools, going back to 2009. We provided a breakdown of issuance for the total market and by agency in that post. A natural question that arises is how can we benchmark our new dataset? In this case, we look at outstanding balance rather than issuance volume. The Agencies provide quarterly data on total outstanding balances on their web sites. When we compare this to our own data, we get this: ![]() To read the full article, please send an email to inquiry@recursionco.com Over the past 18 months, Recursion has undertaken an extensive effort to aggregate multifamily loans and properties across all three Agencies by Deal Type. The data is complete back to 2009 for all three Agencies and somewhat longer for individual deal types. This allows us to aggregate the loans to the pool and then CMO levels for in-depth analysis. An innovation is that we have tied the loans to the property level, giving us the ability to perform analyses on a wide variety of topics, including ESG considerations and much more[1]. For this note, we will provide a basic overview of the dataset. Here is the topmost view from the Agency level: To read the full article, please send an email to inquiry@recursionco.com On February 9, Ginnie Mae announced a new Low-Moderate Income Borrower (LMBI) disclosure[1] “in response to investor interest in having greater transparency into Ginnie Mae mortgages in pools, in particular as part of meeting Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) investment mandates”.
“The new disclosures capture the number of underlying loans made to LMI borrowers, the percentage of LMI loan count of total loan count, the unpaid principal balance (UPB) of LMI loans in the mortgage-backed security (MBS), and the percentage of LMI UPB of total MBS UPB.” “LMI households are classified according to the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) Median Family Income Report Tables[2] corresponding with the time of loan origination. These disclosures are being provided at the aggregate pool level for Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) loans originated beginning in 2012.” In other words, grist for the Recursion mill. First, we look at the share of Ginnie vintage 2012 and later pools that consist of loans for which more than 50% are LMBI borrowers: In recent posts, we introduced the phrase “Mortgage Winter” to describe the current environment where high-interest rates and elevated home prices lead to a severe drop in transaction volumes[1]. Subsequently, we looked at the impact of this situation on individual market participants[2]. The bulk of market participants across the mortgage ecosystem is experiencing year/year revenue declines of two-thirds or more. These entities are having to adjust their business models to this situation and develop strategies to navigate the uncertain environment ahead.
Spring will come, but whether the ensuing rebound will be sufficient to return the sector to a state of financial health is a question that remains far from assured. There is also another factor to consider besides revenue, and that is the potential for increased servicing costs associated with delinquent borrowers. |
Archives
October 2023
Tags
All
|