We received the monthly GSE data download for the June book of business over the weekend and prepayment speeds dropped for the second consecutive month, with the 1-month CPR printed 22.4, the low posted since 17.1% was reached in February 2020 just before the onset of the pandemic. Mortgage rates are of course the key driver here, but other issues matter as well, notably lending capacity. With the onset of the pandemic and the associated loosening of monetary policy and spike in demand for housing away from dense locations, the mortgage industry became overwhelmed. Originators were busy hiring and increased their capacity over the past 18 month to deal with the long period of refinancing activity. However, as prepayment speeds slow down, it appears that the capacity building may be overshooting. In response, originators have started to lower their underwriting standards to create enough volume to fully utilize the capacity. Traditionally, the industry fine-tunes its production through tweaking its credit standards to keep its pipeline as full as possible. This is occurring now notably for refinance mortgages: What we can see is that purchase demand remains strong, with the swing product being refinance mortgages. It is evident that lenders are trying to smooth out refinance production with countercyclical credit tightening and loosening. As credit scores are higher than was the case in the pre-pandemic period there is room to ease further, but the ultimate extent is highly uncertain.
Last August we reported that we had downloaded 2019 HMDA and detailed queries were accessible to our clients via HMDA Analyzer[1]. Recently, the CFPB provided a preliminary release of 2020 data, with information from smaller reporters coming a bit later in the year. Nevertheless, the new data is available on HMDA Analyzer and several insights can already be gained. 1. Total Origination loan count grew to its highest level since the runup to the Global Financial Crisis, driven by a surge in refinancings: 2. Nonbanks Rule – Covid 19 accelerated the long-term trend increase in nonbank lending share: 3. The held on book share collapsed, as banks preferred to hold mortgage risk in the form of MBS to avoid the potential for credit losses: Much more can be found through with just a few clicks of the button. The increase in the number of cashout refis has led to some concerns about the implications for the quality of household balance sheets, similar to what occurred in the run-up to the Global Financial Crisis[1]. At that time, many homeowners were tempted to use their houses as a “piggy bank” as the national savings rate hit all-time lows. In the runup to the Global Financial Crisis, the national savings rate hit a sixty-year low of 2.2% while over the 2016-2019 period the rate averaged a much healthier 7.6%[2]. It is useful to scale the magnitude of assets being cashed out and Freddie Mac releases a very useful file documenting this quarterly for their book of business back to 1994[3]. In the fourth quarter of 2020, the amount cashed out reached $48.4 billion, about 58% of the $84.0 billion peak attained in the second quarter of 2006. As a share of household net worth, the most recent data point is 3.7%, well below the peak of 12.7% reached in Q2 2006. It’s useful along these lines to ask about the credit profile of cashouts compared to other refinancings. Freddie Mac didn’t report cashout refi separately until 2008 Q3, but the following useful picture can be obtained. In general, lenders tend to “lean against the wind” by loosening credit conditions when demand for credit declines, and vice versa. Interestingly, it appears that the share of noncashout loans follows a pattern in which the share rises when credit in general is tightened. At the present time, the average FICO score in March for noncashouts was a tight 764, vs 753 for cashouts. It is difficult to pin the rise in equity cashouts in the current cycle to loosening credit conditions. Of course, the proof is in performance, and now that we have loan-level DQs for the GSE’s beginning last month, we can look at this broken down by loan purpose for the Freddie Mac book: The performance of cashouts is mildly worse than that for noncashouts, but more in line with purchase mortgages. These statistics will bear watching in future months, particularly as forbearance programs begin to expire towards the end of the year. In a recent post, we discussed our comment letter to FHFA regarding policies and procedures related to property inspection wavers (PIWs)[1]. In that note we commented that one of the best ways to assess the impact of the program is to look at the performance of loans with appraisal waivers vs those eligible to obtain waivers but did not. At the time the note was posted (late February 2021) the loan-level data needed to perform such a calculation was not available, so we used a sample obtained from the reference loans in the pools used by the Fannie Mae Connecticut Avenue Security (CAS) Credit Risk Transfer (CRT) program.
Earlier this month we obtained the loan level DQ data for the books of the GSEs as of the end of February 2021 so a more comprehensive analysis is now possible. As stated in the comment letter, the eligibility rules to obtain a PIW vary by product type and agency, so to obtain an apples-to-apples comparison we need to look at the performance of loans with waivers against those that are eligible to use them but did not, as opposed to all loans. Since waivers are generally a recent development, we look at performance for loans originated in 2019 and 2020. For some time, we have been talking about the key driver of mortgage performance is policy rather than fundamentals. This theme is certainly evident with the release of agency prepayment data for November[1]. The chart below chart displays the gap between the 1M prepayment speeds between Ginnie Mae and GSE securities:
We received complete GSE data for November late last week and as always there is a lot to churn on. Another record high of issuance was achieved, although this was entirely due to a surge in refi deliveries (+$16 Bln from October) while purchase deliveries declined slightly (-$7 Bln). Lack of supply and softer seasonal demand appear to be weighing on purchase volumes. A long-term trend in these comments is the trend decline in the bank share of deliveries to the GSE’s[1]. We have commented that the Covid-19 pandemic has played to the natural technological advantage of nonbanks, while eroding the value of the bank branch networks, particularly for purchase mortgages. Interestingly, a little bit of a reverse trade can be seen the last couple of months, at least in purchase mortgages. The chart below looks at the bank share, graphed against the gap in the weighted average coupon between nonbanks and banks (“WAC Gap”). There is a distinct correlation between these two series, although considerable noise is also apparent. Many factors drive market share including underwriting characteristics and product types, but the basic relationship comes across. In November, the gap in the WAC between Nonbanks and Banks increased by almost 4 basis points from October, which was attained by a 3 bp drop in the nonbank WAC being exceeded by a 7 bp drop in that of banks. In a market measured in tens of billions, a single bp has significance. The question going forward is whether the decline in the rates of banks’ offerings is supported by efficiency enhancements or simply reflects reduced profitability. The answer to this is key in determining the question of their long-term role in this market. [1] See, for example: https://www.recursionco.com/blog/besieged-banks
In a recent post we noted the recent striking rise in the GSE refinance share and commented that the rate of this activity in GNM programs, while still rising, has lagged[1]. This seems to be related to the tendency of capacity constrained lenders to provide credit to the highest quality borrowers, and to a looming 0.5% fee hike on GSE refinance deliveries scheduled for December 1.
Focusing on FHA alone, the share of refinance loans compared to those delivered to the GSE’s has plummeted in recent months: Unlike the situation during the Global Financial Crisis, imbalances in the housing market are not the root cause of the Covid-19 economic downturn. Instead, housing is helping to pull the economy out of its pandemic-induced swoon. House price rises have accelerated, due both to low interest rates, as well as to household relocations away from high-density areas. This is leading to increased construction, and improved household balance sheets. Moreover, a surge in refinances improves household cash flow. How long can this trend continue?
The answer to this question depends crucially on many varied policy settings that influence lender and borrower behavior. The chart below shows 1-month CPR for 30-yr MBS securities broken down between the 30-Year GSEs and 30-Year FHA for the 2017cohort. A number of fundamental and policy factors come into play. |
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